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A NEW APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS OF MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION 




The purpose of this article is to quantify how bank capital determines the effects of 
monetary policy on bank lending. Additionally, we test how these effects differ during monetary 
contractions and expansions. Using a sample of 3,028 European banks between 1999 and 2012, 
we find that the reduction in loans caused by monetary restrictions is similar across banks 
regardless of their capital. In addition, during monetary expansions, banks increase their loan 
supply more as they become better capitalized. Contrary to previous studies, there are 
differences in the monetary policy transmission through capital only during expansionary 
monetary regimes. These results are relevant because previous studies have not measured how 
the marginal effect of monetary policy on the growth of loans varies with the value of capital. 
We contribute to the existing literature by using a new approach that quantifies this marginal 
effect, which considerably improves the interpretation of statistical results from models that 
include continuous variable interactions and allows a better understanding of the role of bank 
capital in the transmission of monetary shocks.  
 
Keywords: Monetary policy; Bank capital; Loan supply; Marginal effect; Continuous variable 
interaction. 




 The role played by financial institutions is crucial to understanding how monetary 
policy influences the real economy. In the economic literature and among practitioners, there 
has been a great interest in analyzing the role of banks in the monetary policy transmission 
through the bank lending channel. According to this channel, monetary policy impulses, both 
restrictive and expansionary, alter loan supply by affecting the access of banks to loanable funds 
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1988). On one hand, a restrictive monetary policy increases the level of 
required reserves that banks must hold in the Central Bank, which limits the volume of deposits 
to the availability of reserves (Kashyap and Stein, 1995). In addition, monetary restrictions 
reduce deposit yields in relation to other assets, thereby reducing households’ willingness to 
hold them (Kishan and Opiela, 2000). Because deposits are an important source of funding for 
banks, the reduction of the deposit base caused by a monetary restriction will lead them to 
curtail lending. On the other hand, an expansionary monetary policy alleviates financial frictions 
and increases the assets that banks have available to lend (Gibson, 1997). Additionally, low 
interest rates reduce the overall risk portfolio of banks, which induces them to increase loan 
supply and to loosen credit standards (Maddaloni and Peydro, 2011). 
 
 Monetary policy affects not only bank deposits, but also external finance. This fact has 
led other authors to propose other mechanism for the bank lending channel, owing to the 
increased use of market-based funding (Disyatat, 2011). Monetary restrictions increase the risk 
perceptions of banks and deteriorate their balance sheets. This pushes up the cost of market 
funding for banks, thus leading to a reduction in credit supply. This mechanism has been 
especially relevant during the crisis because the greater difficulties experienced by banks in 
getting funding in the financial markets have made lending more sensitive to monetary shocks 
(Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011). 
 
 The previously mentioned effects of monetary policy on bank loans vary depending on 
several variables related to the financial strength of banks. This financial strength was 
traditionally measured through three indicators: size, liquidity, and capital (Kashyap and Stein, 
1995; 2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000; 2006). Some papers showed market concentration to be 
another factor that influences the ability of banks to protect their lending from monetary shocks 




considered banks’ credit risk and countries’ sovereign risk in the analysis of the bank lending 
channel (Altunbas et al., 2010; Cantero-Saiz, et al., 2014). In general, these studies showed that 
banks that are smaller, are less liquid, are more poorly capitalized, have higher credit risk, and 
operate in less concentrated banking markets and in countries with higher sovereign risk are 
more sensitive to monetary contractions due to their limited ability to access funding. 
 
Among the variables related to the financial strength of banks, capital has received 
special attention due to its important role in sustaining lending during the crisis and the new 
reforms on capital requirements through the adoption of the Basel Accords
2
. During monetary 
restrictions, banks with lower capital reduce their loan supply more compared with better 
capitalized banks for two reasons. First, more poorly capitalized banks are more exposed to 
asymmetric information and moral hazard problems and, thus, are perceived as more risky by 
market participants. In consequence, these banks find it more difficult and expensive to access 
external finance (Jayaratne and Morgan, 2000). Second, an increase in the cost of funds, due to 
a restrictive monetary policy, reduces bank profits and, hence, capital. This causes less 
capitalized banks to reduce lending to a greater extent to lower the risk of being 
undercapitalized in the future (Bolton and Freixas, 2006).  
 
Empirical studies in the United States confirmed the idea that lending from lower 
capitalized banks is more affected by monetary restrictions (Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Kishan 
and Opiela, 2000; Van den Heuvel, 2002; 2012). Contrary to these studies, which only 
considered monetary contractions, Kishan and Opiela (2006) reported similar results but also 
found that monetary expansions were not effective in boosting the lending of less capitalized 
banks after the adoption of Basel I. Unlike those in the United States, empirical studies in 
Europe found mixed results on the role of capital in the monetary policy transmission process. 
On one hand, some papers supported the evidence obtained in the United States during 
monetary restrictions (Altunbas et al., 2002; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Gambacorta, 
2005, Jiménez et al., 2012). On the other hand, other studies found that capital does not affect 
lending from European banks during monetary contractions; probably because there are lower 
informational asymmetries in Europe than in the United States, banks use their capital to protect 
themselves against financing problems instead of for lending purposes, and accounting practices 
during the crisis may have reduced the informative power of capital ratios (Ehrmann et al., 
2003; Jimborean, 2009; Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011). 
 
One of the shortcomings of the literature on the role of bank capital in the monetary 
policy transmission is that it focuses on an empirical methodology that relies on categorical 
variables to construct the capital and monetary policy indicators (Kishan and Opiela, 2000; 
2006; Altunbas et al., 2002; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Gambacorta, 2005). This means 
that banks are categorized according to their level of capital (e.g., low or well-capitalized). This 
approach limits the interpretation of results to the number of categories defined in the empirical 
specification and does not consider the differences across banks within the same category. 
Besides, these studies are not highly comparable with each other because they adopt different 




Additionally, although some studies used continuous variables to construct the interaction 
terms between monetary policy and capital (Ehrmann et al., 2003; Jimborean, 2009; 
Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011; Jiménez et al., 2012), they did not exploit the benefits 
of continuous variables. Their approach only considered the effects of monetary restrictions on 
lending for a specific value of capital. However, because continuous variables can adopt infinite 
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 See, among others, Meh and Moran (2010), Brei et al. (2012), Francis and Osborne (2012), Shaw et al. 
(2013), and Ono (2015). 
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 For instance, Kishan and Opiela (2000; 2006) suggested that the category of “undercapitalized” banks 
comprises those with a capital-to-assets ratio lower than 8%, whereas Altunbas et al. (2002) considered as 
“undercapitalized” those banks with a capital ratio below 5%. On the other hand, Gambacorta (2005) 
defined the capital ratios of “poorly capitalized” and “well-capitalized” banks as below the 10
th
 percentile 
and above the 90
th




values, it is possible to completely analyze the effects of monetary decisions, both restrictive 
and expansionary, on loan supply at any level of capital. 
 
On the other hand, most of these studies analyze the role of capital during monetary 
restrictions exclusively. To our knowledge, only Kishan and Opiela (2006) investigated the 
effects of restrictive and expansionary monetary policies separately. However, these authors 
divided the monetary policy indicator into restrictive and expansionary policy stances, 
depending on whether the interest rates increase or decrease, respectively. The inclusion of two 
possible values for the monetary policy indicator (restrictive or expansionary monetary regime) 
does not allow analyzing the different variations of interest rates that can occur within the same 
monetary regime.  
 
In this regard, this study provides a new contribution to the existing literature. We 
analyze how bank capital affects the loans supply reaction to both monetary contractions and 
expansions by including interaction terms between continuous variables (monetary policy and 
bank capital). In particular, we exploit the advantages of continuous variables by assessing how 
the marginal effects of monetary policy on the growth of loans vary with the value of capital.  
 
This new approach provides several advantages over previous studies on this topic. First, 
it considerably improves the interpretation of statistical results because it exploits all the 
information included in the variables used to construct the interaction terms. Second, it provides 
a better and more precise understanding for monetary authorities and banking regulators of how 
capital determines the effects of monetary policy on lending during both restrictive and 
expansionary regimes. 
 




Our sample comprises credit institutions (banks, savings banks, and cooperative banks) 
from 12 Eurozone countries
4
 over the period 1999 to 2012. The financial information on each 
credit institution comes from the BanksScope database, whereas the macroeconomic 
information comes from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, OECD 
statistics, the European Central Bank, and EuroStat. 
 
According to Favero et al. (1999), and Olivero et al. (2011), we remove from the sample 
those institutions that fulfill some of these conditions: 1) banks with negative values of assets, 
loans, deposits, interest income, and expenses; 2) banks with growth rates of loans or deposits 
greater than 300%; 3) banks with loans 100 times greater than deposits; 4) banks with a 
marginal lending activity, defined as those with a proportion of loans over deposits lower than 
10%; and 5) banks with total asset variations of more than 75% in a year, which are those that 
have probably been involved in mergers or acquisitions. 
 
Because we include some variables lagged one year, we use a panel of credit institutions 
with data available for a minimum of five consecutive years between 1999 and 2012. This 
condition is essential in testing for second-order serial correlations, which is carried out to 
ensure the robustness of the estimates obtained by System-GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
 
Table 1 shows the number of institutions and observations from each country and the 
temporary distribution of the sample. 
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2.2 Econometric model 
 
We propose the following model based on the approach of other studies (Kishan and 
Opiela, 2000; 2006; Altunbas et al., 2002; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004). However, our study 
contributes to the previous approach by considering the advantages of including bank capital 
and monetary policy indicators as continuous variables. The interaction of these continuous 
variables allows exploiting all the information included in them and analyzing how the marginal 
effect of monetary policy on the growth of loans varies with the value of capital: 
 
Δ ln(loans)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1Δ ln(loans)𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗Δi𝑚,𝑡−𝑗
1
𝑗=0 + 𝜌1𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜇𝑗Δi𝑚,𝑡−𝑗
1
𝑗=0 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 +
∑ 𝜖𝑗(Δi𝑚,𝑡−𝑗 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1)
21
𝑗=0 + 𝜌2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜌3𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜌4𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜏𝑗Δi𝑚,𝑡−𝑗
1
𝑗=0 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 +
∑ 𝜃𝑗Δi𝑚,𝑡−𝑗
1
𝑗=0 ∗ 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑗Δi𝑚,𝑡−𝑗
1
𝑗=0 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜌5𝑀𝐶𝑚,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜔𝑗Δi𝑚,𝑡−𝑗
1
𝑗=0 ∗ 𝑀𝐶𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜌6𝑆𝑅𝑚,𝑡 +
∑ 𝛾𝑗Δi𝑚,𝑡−𝑗
1
𝑗=0 ∗ 𝑆𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗Δ ln(GDP)𝑚,𝑡−𝑗
1
𝑗=0 + ∑ 𝜋𝑡Year𝑡 +
13
𝑡=1 ∑ 𝜗𝑚Country𝑚 +
11
𝑚=1 𝑖,𝑡    (1) 
The dependent variable, ∆ln(Loans)i,t, is the growth rate in loan supply from bank i in 
year t relative to year t-1 (Ehrmann et al., 2003; Gambacorta, 2005; Jimborean, 2009; 
Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011). Following previous studies, we include the growth 
rate of loans lagged one year (∆ln(Loans)i,t-1) as an independent variable to capture the 
persistence of the dependent variable. 
 
The monetary policy indicator ∆i is measured by the change in the short-term money 
market rate (Ehrmann et al., 2003; Altunbas et al., 2010; Olivero et al., 2011). We include the 
current and lagged one-year monetary policy indicators (∆im,t and ∆im,t-1) because banks may not 
react immediately to monetary shocks (Jimborean, 2009). We expect an increase in the money 
market rate to lead to a reduction in loan supply. 
 
CAP represents the capital of banks and is the ratio of equity over assets
5
. Banks with 
higher levels of capital extend more credit; hence, this variable should have a positive 
coefficient (Kishan and Opiela, 2000; 2006). 
 
We also include the interaction terms between the monetary policy indicators (∆im,t and 
∆im,t-1) and capital (CAP) to measure the effects of capitalization on loan supply reaction to 
monetary policy. Less capitalized banks have more difficult access to funding; thus, their 
lending is more affected by monetary restrictions (Kishan and Opiela, 2000; 2006; Altunbas et 
al., 2002). 
 
Previous studies suggested that the monetary policy transmission through bank capital 
should be different during monetary contractions and expansions (Kishan and Opiela, 2006). In 
this regard, more capitalized banks are less affected by monetary restrictions and benefit more 
from monetary expansions. To capture this different effect for banks with higher capital, we 





. If such different effect exists, these variables should have 
a positive coefficient. Thus, when there is an increase in the short-term money market rate, the 
reduction in bank loans caused by a restrictive monetary policy should be less pronounced for 
more capitalized banks. In addition, when the short-term money market rate decreases, the 
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 Following previous studies, we include this variable lagged one year to avoid endogeneity bias 
(Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Gambacorta, 2005; Jimborean, 2009). 
6
 Cantero-Saiz et al. (2014) introduced a similar squared interaction variable to capture asymmetric 




Apart from capital (CAP), we also include as control variables in Equation (1) three 
additional bank-specific characteristics: SIZE, LIQ, and LLP
7
. SIZE represents the logarithm of 
total assets. Normally, larger banks enjoy higher loan growth rates; thus, we expect this variable 
to have a positive coefficient (Kashyap and Stein, 1995; 2000).  LIQ is the ratio of cash and 
securities over total assets. Liquid banks are more able to increase their loan supply; hence, this 
variable should have a positive sign (Kashyap and Stein, 2000). LLP represents the credit risk of 
a bank and is measured by the proportion of loan-loss-provisions over total loans. Banks with 
higher credit risk have lower loan growth rates; thus, we expect a negative sign for this variable 
(Altunbas et al., 2010; Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011). 
 
We also include the interaction terms between the monetary policy indicators (∆im,t and 
∆im,t-1) and these three bank-specific characteristics (SIZE, LIQ, and LLP) to measure the effects 
of these specific characteristics on lending reaction to monetary policy. First, several studies 
found that smaller banks are more sensitive to monetary contractions (Kashyap and Stein, 1995; 
2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000). Second, most studies indicated that more liquid banks are less 
sensitive to monetary shocks because they can more easily avoid the reduction in bank lending 
caused by monetary contractions through their liquid assets (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Ehrmann 
et al., 2003; Gambacorta, 2005). Third, banks with higher credit risk reduce their loan supply 
more under monetary restrictions (Altunbas et al., 2010; Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 
2011). 
 
We use continuous variables to construct the previous interaction terms between 
monetary policy and the four bank-specific characteristics (CAP, SIZE, LIQ, and LLP). To 
interpret these interactions properly, the bank-specific characteristics are normalized with 











































Eit is total equity, Ait denotes total assets, Lit refers to securities and cash due from banks, 
Pit indicates loan-loss-provisions, Loansit is total loans, and Nt is the number of banks. 
The normalization implies that in Equation (1), the mean of the interaction terms is zero, 
and the parameters βj are interpreted as the average effect of monetary policy on loan supply 
growth. The coefficients of the bank-specific characteristics (ρj; j:1,..,4) describe the effects that 
these characteristics have on the growth of loans when the change in the short-term money 
market rates (∆im,t and ∆im,t-1) is zero. The coefficients of the interaction terms (μj, τj, θj, φj) show 
whether the bank-specific characteristics affect the way loan supply reacts to monetary shocks. 
Finally, we introduce three macroeconomic indicators as control variables: MC, SR, and 
∆ln(GDP)). MC refers to market concentration. We use the Herfindahl Index in terms of assets 
obtained from the European Central Bank (ECB). We interact this variable with the monetary 
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 As in the case of capital (CAP), these three bank-specific characteristics are lagged one year to avoid 
endogeneity problems (Kashyap and Stein, 1995; 2000; Ehrmann et al., 2003). 
8





policy indicators (∆im,t and ∆im,t-1). Previous studies showed that there is a positive relationship 
between these interactions and loan supply growth (Adams and Amel, 2011; Olivero et al., 
2011). 
SR denotes sovereign risk, which we calculate as the risk premium of a country relative to 
Germany. Recently, Cantero-Saiz et al. (2014) showed that banks operating in countries with 
higher sovereign risk are more sensitive to monetary restrictions. We also include the interaction 
terms between this variable and the monetary policy indicators (∆im,t and ∆im,t-1). 
The variable ∆ln(GDP) measures the nominal gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate 
and controls for loan demand. Better economic conditions increase profitable investment 
projects, which boost the demand for bank credit. Several studies found that GDP growth 
impulses loan supply (Gambacorta, 2005; Jimborean, 2009; Altunbas et al., 2010). Thus, we 
expect a positive coefficient for this variable. 
 
Country and year dummies are included as control variables. ɛi,t is the error term. i = 1, 
2,…, N refers to a specific bank i; m = 1, 2,…, M indicates a particular country m; t = 1, 2,…, T 
indicates a specific year t; and j denotes the number of lags.  
Table 2 provides a summary of the independent variables and their expected relationship 
with the dependent variable. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables included in 
the analysis. Table 4 presents the correlations between the variables to identify potential 
collinearity problems. 
[Insert Tables 2, 3 & 4] 
The model proposed in Equation (1) is estimated by using the two-step System-GMM 
methodology on dynamic panel data. This allows controlling for endogeneity problems and 
obtaining consistent and unbiased estimates by using lagged independent variables as 
instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Bank-specific characteristics and their interactions with 
monetary policy are considered to be endogenous, whereas macroeconomic variables are 
exogenous (Jimborean, 2009; Cantero-Saiz et al., 2014). We follow an estimation strategy that 
uses between the second and the fourth lag as instruments. 
2.3 Results and discussion 
Table 5 shows the analysis results. In model (a), we include the variables most commonly 
used in previous studies: capital (CAP), size (SIZE), liquidity (LIQ), credit risk (LLP), and 
market concentration (MC). In model (b), we add the variable SR to control for sovereign risk; 
and in model (c), we control for structural breaks caused by the crisis. 
[Insert Table 5] 
In model (a), the monetary policy indicator (Δi) has the expected negative sign but only 
for the current variable. Consequently, an increase in the short-term money market rate leads to 
an immediate reduction in bank loans. As we have proposed, the quadratic interaction between 
capital (CAP) and current monetary policy is positive and significant. However, because we are 
dealing with the interaction of two continuous variables (monetary policy and capital), the 
marginal effect of monetary policy on the growth of loans will depend on the value of capital. 
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= 𝛽0 + 𝜇0𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 2𝜖0Δi𝑚,𝑡(𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑖,𝑡−1)
2
+ 𝜏0𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃0𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 +
 𝜑0𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝜔0𝑀𝐶𝑚,𝑡        (2) 
Because the variables SIZE, LIQ, and LLP are normalized with respect to their means, the 
marginal effect for an average bank is: 
∂Δ ln(loans)𝑖,𝑡
𝜕Δi𝑚,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝜇0𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 2𝜖0Δi𝑚,𝑡(𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑖,𝑡−1)
2
+ 𝜔0𝑀𝐶𝑚,𝑡   (3) 
The marginal effect in Equation (3) depends on the monetary policy variable, thus this 
marginal effect will vary depending on the different values of the monetary policy indicator. 
Therefore, we estimate the marginal effects for an average bank in two different scenarios: a 
0.75% increase and a 0.75% decrease in the monetary policy variable (short-term money market 
rate). We choose this percentage because it is the closest multiple of 0.25% to the mean annual 
increase/decrease in the short-term money market rate from 1999 to 2012
10
. In addition, because 
the variable MC is not normalized, to calculate the marginal effect, we replace MC with the 
median of the countries in the sample. The marginal effect also changes with the level of capital 
(CAP). The measure of this marginal effect is the main purpose of this article, so that we check 
how the effects of monetary policy on lending vary along all the possible values that our capital 
variable (CAP) adopt, as opposed to previous studies which only considered these effects at 
specific values of bank capital. Since our capital variable (CAP) can adopt infinite values, we 
need to construct plots to interpret the results properly. 
Figure 1 shows the marginal effect of monetary policy on the growth of loans in relation 
to the normalized capital with respect to the mean
11
 when the short-term money market rate 
increases by 0.75%. The dotted lines represent the 90% confidence interval
12
. Confidence 
intervals of 90% allow us to determine the conditions under which monetary policy has a 
statistically significant effect on the growth of loans (whenever both upper and lower bounds of 
the 90% confidence interval are either above or below zero). An increase in the short-term 
money market rate leads to a reduction in lending for banks whose normalized capital with 
respect to the mean is below 0.6973 (0.7827 without normalization). In this interval, the 
marginal effect on bank loans is similar (between -0.1565 and -0.1652). For a capital-to-assets 
ratio of 0.7827 or higher, the marginal effect is not significant because the upper bound of the 
90% confidence interval is above zero, whereas the lower bound is below zero. Therefore, there 
is no evidence in our sample that these highly capitalized banks reduce their loan supply during 
monetary restrictions. However, we should bear in mind that these banks represent only 0.16% 
of our sample, which is why we conclude that, in general, capital does not lead to large 
differences in loan supply reaction to monetary restrictions. The results with the new approach 
presented in this article differ from those of previous studies, which suggested that more poorly 
capitalized banks are more sensitive to monetary contractions (Altunbas et al., 2002; Kishan and 
Opiela, 2000; 2006; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Gambacorta, 2005; Jiménez et al., 2012). 
Greater uncertainty, funding restrictions, and risk aversion in the crisis years probably lead 
banks to keep more capital for precautionary purposes instead of lending it out, which is why 
                                                          
10
 We chose multiples of 0.25% because the ECB adjusts its target rates using these multiples during our 
sample period. We also estimated the marginal effect by using different increases/decreases in the short-
term money market rate. We started from the minimum rate variation in our sample and added 0.25% to 
the previous value until we reached the maximum variation in our sample. The results are similar to the 
0.75% increase/decrease reported in this article but are intensified as the variation in interest rates 
increases. These findings are not included but are available on request. 
11
 As we mentioned previously, the variable CAP is normalized with respect to the mean in Equation (1), 
similarly to the other bank-specific characteristics (SIZE, LIQ, and LLP). 
12




highly capitalized banks do not show a lower decrease in loan supply during monetary 
contractions. 
 [Insert Figure 1] 
Figure 2 shows the marginal effect of monetary policy on the growth of loans in relation 
to the normalized capital when the short-term money market rate decreases by 0.75%. In this 
scenario, we must interpret the marginal effect carefully. Because we are assessing the effect of 
a decrease in the interest rate, if the marginal effect is positive, a reduction in the interest rate 
will have the opposite sign (negative), and vice versa. Figure 2 shows that the positive effect on 
lending of a reduction in the short-term money market rate is lower for banks with low levels of 
capital. The positive effect has its minimum (0.1675) when the level of normalized capital with 
respect to the mean is -0.0827 (0.0027 without normalization). However, when the level of 
capital increases, this positive effect becomes larger. The marginal effect reaches a maximum 
(0.3582) when the level of normalized capital is equal to 0.8173 (0.9027 without normalization). 
Therefore, banks benefit more from monetary expansions as they become better capitalized. An 
expansionary monetary policy alleviates financial frictions and improves balance sheets; hence, 
banks with a larger capital base can increase their loan supply more compared with those that 
have poor levels of capital. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
Regarding the control variables, the variable LLP and its interaction with lagged 
monetary policy are negative and significant. Therefore, the lending growth of banks with 
higher credit risk is more sensitive to monetary contractions. The interaction between MC and 
current monetary policy is significant with a positive coefficient; therefore, banks that operate in 
more concentrated markets can better insulate their lending from monetary shocks. Finally, the 
variable ∆ln(GDP) is significant with a positive coefficient; thus, an increase in the GDP growth 
impulses bank lending. 
In the last few years, as the crisis has worsened, sovereign risk has become an important 
determinant of the ability of banks to provide lending (Cantero-Saiz, et al., 2014). Thus, in 
Table 5, we add the variable SR to model (b) to control for the sovereign risk of the countries 
where banks operate. In addition, the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 supposed severe 
financial restrictions for banks and led them to curtail lending. To control for structural breaks 
caused by the crisis, we estimate model (b), adding the interaction term between the capital 
(CAP) and a dummy variable PCt. This dummy takes the value of 1 for the years 1999 to 2007 
and 0 otherwise; therefore, it represents the years before the outbreak of the crisis. The results of 
these models are similar to those of model (a). Besides, the marginal effects of monetary policy 
on the growth of loans in relation to the normalized capital based in these models are similar to 





The role of bank capital in the transmission of monetary policy has received special 
attention in the last years due to the ability of such capital to maintain lending during the crisis 
and the changes in the banking industry following new regulations on capital adequacy 
requirements. This study analyzes how bank capital determines the effects of monetary policy 
on loan supply during restrictive and expansionary regimes. Previous studies about this topic in 
general have shown that lending from lower capitalized banks is more affected by monetary 
restrictions and that such banks benefit less from monetary expansions (Kishan and Opiela, 
2000; 2006; Altunbas et al., 2002; Van den Heuvel, 2002; 2012; Gambacorta, 2005; Jiménez et 
al., 2012). However, these studies either focused on an empirical specification that considers 
capital and monetary policy indicators as categorical variables or, although some used 
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 The Figures of the marginal effects of monetary policy on loan supply growth in relation to the 




continuous variables, did not consider the advantages of these variables. Thus, this approach 
does not allow exploiting all the information included in the variables and provides a narrow 
interpretation of the results. This article provides a new contribution to the existing literature 
because it exploits the advantages of including interaction terms between continuous variables. 
In particular, we analyze how the marginal effects of monetary policy on loan supply vary with 
the level of capital. This new focus supposes an improvement in the interpretation of statistical 
results compared with previous studies and allows a more detailed understanding of how bank 
capital determines lending reaction to monetary shocks. 
 
By using a sample of European banks over the period 1999 to 2012, we show that the 
negative effects of monetary restrictions on loan supply are similar across banks, regardless of 
their capitalization. However, better capitalized banks benefit more from monetary expansions 
because they proportionally increase lending to a greater extent compared with those that have 
lower levels of capital.  
 
These results are very interesting for capital regulations and for the way monetary policy 
is carried out in Europe. Contrary to previous studies, our findings indicate that capital only 
leads to significant differences in the monetary policy transmission during monetary 
expansions. This suggests that expansionary monetary policies aimed at recovering credit 
during the crisis would be more effective if banking systems were well capitalized. In contrast, 
monetary restrictions would affect loan supply in the same way regardless of the amount of 
capital held by banks. Funding difficulties, risk aversion, and uncertainty during the crisis may 
force banks to maintain more precautionary capital, especially when monetary conditions are 
more restrictive, which is why better capitalized banks do not experience a lower reduction in 
loan supply. However, because monetary expansions alleviate financial frictions and reduce 
financing costs, banks with higher capital are able to increase their lending to a greater extent. 
 
The main implications of these findings are that strengthen capital requirements can be 
important for the ECB to achieve not only its supervisory objective, but also its monetary policy 
objective. Higher capital base is essential for the soundness of the financial system, which 
serves the supervisory objective of the ECB. Besides, our study shows that this higher level of 
capital allows monetary expansions of the ECB to have a more powerful effect on loans and to 
stabilize the credit cycle. This article has tried to shed light on the effects of bank capital on the 
transmission of monetary policy through loan supply. However, further research is needed to 
fully understand the role of capital in the monetary policy transmission and in the new 
regulatory environment. On one hand, since banks act as both lenders and borrowers, it would 
be interesting to use the methodology shown in this article to quantify how capital determines 
the effects of monetary shocks on the cost of debt funding for banks. On the other hand, it could 
be quantified how changes in capital requirements affect the supply of lending. 
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Tables and Figures 
TABLE 1: SAMPLE 
PANEL A: NUMBER OF BANKS PER COUNTRY 
 
Number of observations Number of banks 
Austria 2,136 229 
Belgium 283 38 
Finland 35 6 
France 1,703 221 
Germany 18,109 1,753 
Greece 99 17 
Ireland 74 13 
Italy 3,014 532 
Luxembourg 328 48 
Netherlands 166 28 
Portugal 125 23 
Spain 653 120 
Total 26,725 3,028 
PANEL B: TEMPORARY DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE 





















Expected relationship with 
loan supply growth 
∆ln(Loans)i,t-1 Growth rate of loans lagged one year Positive/ Negative 
 
Δi 
Monetary policy: change in the short-term money market rate  
Negative 
CAP Capital: ratio of equity over total assets Positive 
Δi*CAP Linear interaction between monetary policy and capital Positive 
(Δi*CAP)2 Quadratic interaction between monetary policy and capital Positive 
SIZE Size: logarithm of total assets Positive 
Δi*SIZE Interaction between monetary policy and size Positive 
LIQ Liquidity: ratio of cash and securities over total assets Positive 
Δi*LIQ Interaction between monetary policy and liquidity Positive 
LLP Credit risk: loan loss provisions over total loans Negative 
Δi*LLP Interaction between monetary policy and credit risk Negative 
MC Market concentration: Herfindahl Index in terms of assets Positive 




Sovereign risk: risk premium of a country relative to Germany  
Negative 
Δi*SR Interaction between monetary policy and sovereign risk Negative 





TABLE 3: SAMPLE STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Δln(loans) 0.0290 0.1419 -1.8127 1.2901 
Δln(GDP) 0.0339 0.0872 -0.1670 0.2780 
Δi -0.2454 1.2532 -3.4059 1.4418 
SIZE 13.6421 1.6650 9.1551 21.6704 
LIQ 0.2394 0.1274 0.0000 0.8619 
CAP 0.0854 0.0499 0.0008 0.9704 
LLP 0.0072 0.0123 -0.2466 0.3906 
SR 0.2902 0.9021 -1.1954 21.0025 
MC 0.0320 0.0280 0.0140 0.3700 
The statistics of the variables SIZE, LIQ, CAP and LLP are calculated before the normalization to show more 
comprehensive information. 
TABLE 4: CORRELATIONS 
 
Δln(GDP) Δi SIZE LIQ CAP LLP SR MC 
Δln(GDP) 1 
       
Δi 0.3981 1 
      
SIZE -0.0095 -0.0144 1 
     
LIQ -0.0032 0.0321 0.0003 1 
    
CAP -0.0154 -0.0244 -0.1462 -0.1543 1 
   
LLP 0.1010 -0.0131 -0.0472 0.0517 0.0178 1 
  
SR -0.1898 -0.0713 0.0776 -0.1372 0.2596 0.0628 1 
 
MC 0.0070 -0.0130 0.2789 -0.1147 0.1832 -0.0556 0.2710 1 
 
TABLE 5: RESULTS 
 
(a) (b) (c)  





 Δln(GDP)t 1.7405 (2.94) *** 0.8034 (1.32) 
 
0.8648 (1.30) 





 Δi t -0.1890 (-1.92) * -0.1057 (-2.32) ** -0.1137 (-2.22) ** 





 CAP t-1 -0.0884 (-1.26) -0.0466 (-0.73) -0.0445 (-0.49) 
Δi t* CAP t-1 0.0600 (1.62)  0.0511 (1.67) * 0.0529 (1.59)  
Δi t-1* CAP t-1 0.0104 (0.26)  -0.0166 (-0.57)  -0.0040 (-0.14)  
(Δi t* CAP t-1)
2 0.1112 (2.87) *** 0.0988 (2.40) ** 0.0889 (2.24) ** 
(Δi t-1* CAP t-1)
2 0.0102 (0.38)  -0.0069 (-0.32)  0.0037 (0.17)  
CAP t-1* PC t       -0.0155 (-0.18)  





 LIQ t-1 0.0191 (0.51) 
 
0.0503 (2.62) *** 0.0461 (2.14) ** 
LLP t-1 -1.1660 (-1.80) * -1.0602 (-1.88) * -0.9686 (-1.63) 




















 Δi t* LLP t-1 -0.3724 (-1.19) -0.1426 (-0.68) -0.1061 (-0.49) 
Δi t-1* LLP t-1 -0.8810 (-2.44) ** -0.1210 (-0.48)  -0.1712 (-0.69)  





 Δi t* MC t 0.2491 (2.60) *** 0.3816 (3.39) *** 0.3726 (3.59) *** 





 SR t   -0.0276 (-4.35) *** -0.0280 (-4.35) *** 
Δi t* SR t    -0.0058 (-2.75) *** -0.0065 (-2.94) *** 
Δi t-1* SR t    -0.0010 (-0.37) 
 
-0.0021 (-0.71) 
 CONS -0.1465 (-3.67) *** -0.1324 (-5.28) *** -0.1384 (-4.95) *** 
Country dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   
Year dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   











  Coefficients associated with each variable. In brackets, T-student; *** indicates a level of significance of 0.01, ** 
indicates a level of significance of 0.05, * indicates a level of significance of 0.1; m2 is the p-value of the 2nd order 
serial correlation statistic. Linear test is the linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with CAP 
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Fig. 1. Marginal effect of monetary policy on the 
growth of loans in relation to capital when short-term 
money market rate increases by 0.75%. Based on model 
(a), Table 5. 
Fig. 2. Marginal effect of monetary policy on the 
growth of loans in relation to capital when short-term 
money market rate decreases by 0.75%. Based on 
model (a), Table 5. 
